previous proposition followed by the main implication sign, and to set off what follows that sign as a new assertion.
In the same treatise Lewis put his finger on the source of the confusion:
. . . the system takes the laws of the logical relations of propositions for granted in order to prove them.
The decade of the 1920s began with Emil L. Post's seminal doctoral dissertation 2 . Post made Lewis's influence on his thought quite explicit with numerous references to [12] . In his paper, Post studied the propositional calculus 3 of Principia Mathematica as a purely "formal" system making a clear distinction between the theorems of the system and theorems about the system.
We here wish to emphasize that the theorems of this paper are about the logic of propositions but are not included therein. [italics original] Post introduced the use of "truth tables" as a tool for proving theorems "about the logic of propositions." He used the symbols +, − for the truth values and proved that the formulas provable in the Principia Mathematica axiomatization are precisely those whose truth tables consist of a column of +'s. Post noted that his result showed that the Principia propositional calculus is complete and consistent and that it provided an algorithmic procedure for determining whether a given formula was derivable in that system. 4 In Post's proof, he made systematic use of what has come to be called structural induction; it is important to realize that since Whitehead and Russell thought of their development as providing a foundation for arithmetic, and hence for mathematical induction, using induction to develop their system would have seemed hopelessly circular. In proving his main result, Post observed that the Principia rules enabled one to prove for each formula α a formula of the form α ≡ where is in what is now called disjunctive normal form and is obtainable from α by straightforward algebraic operations. Next, for each such containing at least two propositional variables, one of its variables p could be "factored" yielding a provably equivalent formula of the form:
where 1 , 2 , 3 do not contain the variable p. The result then follows easily by induction.
Post not only gave a complete analysis of this part of the WhiteheadRussell system, but also explored a number of important generalizations: The two-valued truth tables that Post introduced were generalized to tables involving an arbitrary finite number of variables. The rules of inference of the propositional calculus were generalized to rules determined by productions of a form so general that (viewed from a later perspective, of course) all recursively enumerable sets of strings were encompassed among the sets of "theorems" of the "logics" that could be defined using such rules. Finally, the ∼, ∨ system of Principia was generalized to arbitrary systems of truth functions that are complete in the sense that every truth function can be obtained by their suitable iteration; in this last case, only the main result is given. 5 In Alonzo Church's dissertation [2] of 1926, Church proposed to do for set theory (including Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers) what the creators of non-Euclidean geometry had done for geometry. Lobachevsky had explicitly considered the parallel postulate of Euclid as a mere assumption the consequences of whose denial could be studied, rather than as an immutable a priori property of space. So Church proposed to consider Zermelo's axiom of choice as likewise a mere assumption the consequences of whose denial could be studied. Indeed, Church proposed a number of different propositions each of which contradicted the axiom of choice as possible "alternatives" to Zermelo's assumption. Although Church's dissertation was written in the style of unformalized axiomatics, he was clearly acutely aware of set theory together with logic as a foundation for mathematics. Indeed, he presciently commented:
It is not improbable that the set of postulates at the basis of our logic is not complete, even if the axiom of choice is included in the set, . . . Noteworthy contributions to logic and foundations of mathematics were few and far between during the twenties. Among these, we may turn to C. H. Langford. In his [8] , [9] Langford developed what has come to be known as the method of elimination of quantifiers to solve the decision problem for the first order theory of dense linear orders. However, despite this very important technical contribution, Langford remained badly confused.
For the authors of Principia, the logic they were developing and studying was the one true logic. Despite Post's emphasis on using mathematical methods to investigate systems of logics as formal combinatorial objects and Church's willingness to explore variant systems of logic, this attitude persisted and is perhaps seen most sharply in Langford's writings. In 1928 Church wrote: 6 The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possibility of a system of logic in which the law of the excluded middle is not assumed . . . In this article, Church argued strongly for an attitude towards the principles of logic that is open to the possibility of studying variant systems. To this, Langford ([10]) hotly retorted:
This means that we cannot have alternative logics; for logic is the system of all propositions expressing analytic facts of a certain kind, namely formal analytic facts, and there cannot in the nature of the case be more than one such system, actual or conceivable. In Europe the year 1928 saw the publication of a little textbook of logic [7] written from the perspective of Hilbert's school that proved to be extremely influential. In particular the propositional calculus and first order logic were developed as formal combinatorial systems with properties that could be investigated by normal mathematical methods. The problem of the completeness of first order logic was presented and provided the young Kurt Gödel with his dissertation topic. The Entscheidungsproblem, the decision problem for first order logic, was characterized as the fundamental problem of mathematical logic; the fact that this problem is unsolvable was to be proved by Church and by Turing (independently of one another) eight years later. C. H. Langford [11] reviewed this book for the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society. His review not only reflected his commitment to the one true logic, but indeed showed that he quite refused to permit himself to begin to understand what the authors were about.
Hilbert and Ackermann began with a formal treatment of the propositional calculus very much after the manner of Post's dissertation. They used four of the five formulas which the Principia development used as "primitive propositions." 7 These were
and observed that they were presented "together with a rule of substitution and a rule of inference. 8 " The parenthetical expressions are (in Principia notation), universal quantifiers; Langford uses them to emphasize his conception of these formulas as representing "analytic formal" truths holding with arbitrary propositions substituted for the variables. Langford is dreadfully puzzled over the authors' proofs that these formulas regarded as axioms are "consistent, independent, and complete."
All we have to do . . . in order to see that propositions (a) -(d), together with the two rules are consistent, is simply to observe that they are all plainly true. Langford's comments on the proofs of independence are even worse:
There is no occasion for examining this argument directly; it is quite certainly mistaken, for the sufficient reason that . . . (c) follows from (a), (b), and (d). For, as Langford notes, the authors have shown that p ⊃ p does follow from (a), (b), and (d); insisting that there is no distinction to be made between p ∨ q and q ∨ p "since only one meaning occurs, namely, 'At least one of the two propositions is true'," Langford asserts that (c) is then just an instance of p ⊃ p. Completeness also falls by the wayside since "such true propositions as ∼ (p, q) · p ∨ q . . . appear to be not derivable by the rules given."
It is a great relief to turn from Langford's nonsense to Haskell Curry's work. Curry, studying with Hilbert, turned to a fundamental analysis of the operation of substitution ( [4] ) previously taken to be primitive. This was the beginning of Curry's work in combinatory logic. Working from an entirely different direction, Church was led in the early 1930s to thecalculus, and eventually to the famous "thesis" that bears his name. 9 It was Church's students Kleene and Rosser who were to show that the -calculus and combinatory logic were fully equivalent.
Studies like this one can have the effect of bolstering a sense of our superiority to our logical forbears. But this would be a serious mistake. The lessons to be learned are rather that the development of the outlook on our subject that today we take for granted was attained only with great difficulty.
